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UNREASONABLE CALCULATIONS OF
“REASONABLE” FEES:
PERDUE V. KENNY A. EX REL. WINN AND THE
SUPREME COURT’S ONGOING STRUGGLE
WITH 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Kristin A.C. Olin*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cowan v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,1 finding that
plaintiff Curtis Cowan had been a victim of racial discrimination in
violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was the easy part.2 The
district court readily awarded Cowan $15,000 in damages for
emotional distress,3 but—like many courts before and since4—it
faltered when it began to contemplate Cowan’s entitlement to
attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.5
Section 1988 appears straightforward: it provides, in pertinent
part, that “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision” of
one of a number of statutes creating a right of action for vindication
of civil rights—including §§ 1981 and 1983—“the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s
fee as part of the costs.”6 However, the Cowan district court was so
confused by U.S. Supreme Court precedent that it rendered three
* J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A. Human Biology, B.A. English 2006,
Stanford University. The author is indebted to Joseph P. Wohrle for his invaluable feedback and
guidance. The author would also like to thank her father, James B. Cohoon, and her fellow Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review editors and staffers—particularly Elena DeCoste Grieco, Heather
Zinkiewicz, Jeffrey Payne, Joshua Rich, and Jennifer Schulz—for their contributions and support.
1. 935 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1991).
2. Id. at 523 (citing Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 703 F. Supp. 177 (D. Conn.
1986)). “Title VII” refers to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
3. Id. (citing Cowan, 703 F. Supp. at 196).
4. See, e.g., infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
5. Cowan, 935 F.2d at 523 (citing Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 728 F. Supp. 87, 89
(D. Conn. 1990)).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).
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alternative attorney’s fees awards, apparently arbitrarily entering
judgment in the amount of the intermediate award and triggering an
appeal in which the Second Circuit overturned the fees award.7
The Cowan trial court is only unusual in its willingness to admit
its confusion—myriad courts have been stymied in their attempts to
apply § 19888 and other exceptions9 to the American Rule, which
requires each party to pay its own attorney’s fees.10 Since Congress
enacted § 1988, courts—including the Supreme Court11—have
struggled to determine when parties may recover attorney’s fees
from their opponents,12 how to calculate “reasonable” fees,13 and
what level of discretion courts may exercise.14
Unfortunately for civil rights plaintiffs like Curtis Cowan, for
parties accused of constitutional violations, and for trial and appellate
court justices, the Supreme Court appears unlikely to answer these
questions any time soon. The Supreme Court’s most recent holding
regarding fees determination under § 1988, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex
rel. Winn,15 appears on its face to provide more guidance to lower
courts than it actually does. Although Perdue purports to distinguish
between facts influencing the lodestar and the enhancement factors,16
the Court confined its holding to the facts at hand,17 avoided
resolving a long-standing inconsistency in the evolution of fees
7. See Cowan, 935 F.2d at 523–24 (citing Cowan, 728 F. Supp. at 89) (reversing and
remanding the trial court’s fees award and granting a fees award in the amount of the trial court’s
highest calculation).
8. The formal title of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of
1976. Id. at 523.
9. Other exceptions include 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 15, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(e), and 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d), though they may be subject to different limitations than 42
U.S.C. § 1988.
10. E.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (“[T]he ‘American Rule’
[provides] that each party in a lawsuit ordinarily shall bear its own attorney’s fees . . . .”).
11. E.g., infra notes 12–13, 15, 28.
12. E.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598 (2001).
13. E.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886
(1984).
14. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2001); Gates v.
Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1399–1400 (9th Cir. 1992); Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F.2d
1258, 1263–64 (9th Cir. 1987).
15. 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010).
16. Id. at 1669. The lodestar and its enhancement will be defined and discussed in detail
beginning infra Part II.
17. See infra Parts III.C.1, 4.
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calculations,18 and declined to make explicit what would make
enhancement reasonable.19
This Comment posits that the Supreme Court should make a
decisive ruling disapproving Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc.’s20 application to fees awards, defining the “prevailing market
rate” in a way that maximizes public benefit, and enumerating the
precise circumstances—if any—that would warrant enhancement of
the lodestar. Part II provides an overview of the judicial mechanisms
for awarding attorney’s fees from § 1988’s enactment in 1976
through Perdue’s publication in 2010. Part III focuses on the
reasoning and issues that the Perdue Court avoided; it also identifies
the sources of today’s inconsistency and uncertainty underlying fees
awards. Part IV suggests a comprehensive solution based on Justice
Scalia’s partial concurrence in Blanchard v. Bergeron,21 Justice
Thomas’s concurring opinion in Perdue, and the majority’s practical
observations in both Blum v. Stenson22 and Perdue itself. It also
explains the benefits—including consistency, predictability, fairness,
and easy application—of the proposed solution. Part V concludes by
recommending that the Supreme Court simplify and clarify feesaward jurisprudence the next time it considers a case like Perdue.
II. BACKGROUND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LODESTAR APPROACH
The lodestar method of calculating reasonable attorney’s fees is
rooted in the pre–42 U.S.C. § 1988 development of hourly billing
practices.23 In the 1940s, attorneys began to “determine whether fees
charged were sufficient to cover overhead and generate suitable
profits” by “record[ing] the hours spent on each case in order to
ensure that fees ultimately charged afforded reasonable
compensation for counsels’ efforts.”24 Hourly billing gradually
replaced other methods of determining fees actually charged because
18. See infra Parts II, III.C.2, 4. This inconsistency involves the so-called Johnson factors’
continuing use: although the Johnson factors have technically been replaced by the lodestar
method of calculating fees awards, they are still widely and irregularly applied. See Johnson v.
Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974); see infra Parts II, III.C.2, 4.
19. See infra Part III.C.3–4.
20. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
21. 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
22. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
23. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 800 (2002).
24. Id.
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it was “administratively convenient” and provided an objective
measure of effort that clients could appreciate.25 By the 1970s, hourly
billing was ubiquitous, but courts still determined awards under feeshifting statutes by other means.26
In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit enumerated twelve factors that
initially appeared to comprise a thorough method of calculating
attorney’s fees.27 Indeed, “both the House and Senate Reports [on
section 1988] refer to the 12 factors set forth in Johnson for assessing
the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee award.”28 Under the Johnson
approach, the Supreme Court directed courts to consider the
following criteria in calculating a reasonable fees award:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform
the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment
by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client; and (12) awards in similar cases.29
In Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,30 the Third Circuit developed
the competing lodestar method almost simultaneously with the
Johnson court’s development of the twelve-factor approach, but the
lodestar did not become dominant until the Supreme Court adopted it
in Hensley v. Eckerhart, a 1983 decision.31 The lodestar is a
monetary figure representing “the product of reasonable hours times

25. Id. at 800–01.
26. Id. at 801.
27. E.g., Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1671–72 (2010); Gisbrecht, 535
U.S. at 801.
28. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91 (1989).
29. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1672 n.4 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3
(1983) (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974))).
30. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
31. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1672.
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a reasonable rate.”32 According to the Supreme Court, the lodestar
method “has, as its name suggests, become the guiding light of []
fee-shifting jurisprudence”33 because it avoids Johnson’s problem of
providing lower courts with “very little actual guidance” and
“unlimited discretion.”34 However, many courts still use the Johnson
factors to determine the lodestar itself,35 enhancements to the
lodestar,36 and other aspects37 of § 1988.
Enhancement of the lodestar—for example, by increasing the
lodestar by 75 percent as the Perdue trial court did38—is perhaps the
most ill-defined aspect of fee awards. Supreme Court “jurisprudence
since Blum has charted ‘a decisional arc that bends decidedly against
enhancements,’”39 but the Supreme Court appears to have eliminated
only four of the twelve Johnson factors as possible grounds for
enhancement since the Hensley Court made the lodestar method
mainstream in 1983 and the Blum Court rejected enhancement in
1984.40
III. INCONSISTENCY AND UNCERTAINTY
A. The District Court’s 75 Percent Enhancement of the Lodestar
Perdue was a suit on behalf of 3,000 children in the Georgia
foster-care system. The District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia resolved their constitutional claims by approving a consent

32. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 559–60 (1992) (quoting Pa. v. Del. Valley
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986)).
33. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1672; Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 801 (2002); Dague, 505
U.S. at 562.
34. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1672 (quoting Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 563).
35. E.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 893–94 & n.9 (1984); Moreno v. City of
Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008).
36. See, e.g., Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 562–65; Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F.2d 1258,
1262 (9th Cir. 1987).
37. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91–93 (1989); id. at 88 (using the Johnson
factors to conclude that an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988 is not “limited to the amount
provided in a contingent-fee arrangement entered into by a plaintiff and his counsel”).
38. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1290 (N.D. Ga. 2006), aff’d,
547 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir.), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010).
39. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1677 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262 & n.6 (“Among the Johnson factors that cannot serve as
independent bases for adjusting fee awards are: (1) the novelty and complexity of the issues,
(2) the special skill and experience of counsel, (3) the quality of representation, and (4) the results
obtained.” (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 898–900; Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 564–68)).
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decree.41 In addition to declaratory and injunctive relief, the consent
decree entitled the children’s attorneys (hereafter “respondents”) to
fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.42
Because the prevailing party has the burden of providing
evidence supporting its requested fee,43 respondents submitted
documentation of their requested hours and rates as well as affidavits
from third parties in support of respondents’ contention that the rates
sought were consistent with prevailing market rates.44 Respondents
also provided affidavits supporting their request for a 100 percent
enhancement to that lodestar,45 asserting that “the lodestar amount
‘would be generally insufficient to induce lawyers of comparable
skill, judgment, professional representation and experience’ to
litigate this case.”46
After reducing non-travel hours by 15 percent and halving the
rate for travel hours to account for vague or excessive billing entries,
the court applied a 75 percent enhancement, resulting in a total fee
award of approximately $10.5 million.47 The court justified the
enhancement by citing respondents’ counsel’s $1.7 million advance
in expenses over three years, lack of compensation during litigation,
uncertain recovery due to their fees’ contingent nature, and generally
extraordinary performance.48
B. The Eleventh Circuit’s Divided Affirmance and
Judge Carnes’s Opinion
A divided Eleventh Circuit appellate panel affirmed both the
lodestar and the enhancement.49 Based on his understanding of
41. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1669.
42. Id. at 1669–70.
43. E.g., Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11.
44. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1670; Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11.
45. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1670, 1675.
46. Id. at 1670.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citation omitted). In praise of counsel’s performance, “[t]he court stated that
respondents’ attorneys had exhibited ‘a higher degree of skill, commitment, dedication, and
professionalism than the Court has seen displayed . . . during its 27 years on the bench,’” “that the
results obtained were ‘extraordinary,’” and that “‘after 58 years as a practicing attorney and
federal judge, the Court is unaware of any other case in which a plaintiff class has achieved such
a favorable result on such a comprehensive scale.’” Id. (citations omitted) (internal ellipses and
brackets omitted).
49. Id.
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Supreme Court precedent, Circuit Judge Carnes disagreed with the
amount of the fees award and insightfully observed that “the quality
of the attorneys’ performance was adequately accounted for either in
determining the reasonable number of hours expended on the
litigation or in setting the reasonable hourly rates,” that “an
enhancement could not be justified based on delay in the recovery of
attorney’s fees and reimbursable expenses because such delay is a
routine feature of cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” and that
the contingent nature of respondents’ compensation did not justify
enhancement.50 Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit denied a motion
for rehearing over Carnes’s and two other judges’ dissents; one of
the other judges felt that the trial judge had rendered his decision
unreviewable by justifying enhancement primarily by comparing
respondents with other counsel whom he had personally observed.51
C. The Supreme Court’s Consideration of the
Enhancement and Subsequent Reversal
1. Goals in Granting Certiorari in Perdue
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the narrow
issue of “whether either the quality of an attorney’s performance or
the results obtained are factors that may properly provide a basis for
an enhancement.”52 Noting that “superior results are relevant only to
the extent it can be shown that they are the result of superior attorney
performance,” the Court further narrowed its inquiry to “whether
superior attorney performance can justify an enhancement.”53
2. Summary of Relevant “Established” Law
The Court delineated the Johnson factors and the competing
lodestar approach, then noted the virtues of the latter: the lodestar
“roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would
have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who
was billed by the hour in a comparable case”; it is “readily
50. Id. at 1671 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1673–74.
53. Id. at 1674. The Court noted that any other cause of excellent results—such as “inferior
performance by defense counsel, unanticipated defense concessions, unexpectedly favorable
rulings by the court, an unexpectedly sympathetic jury, or simple luck”—would not justify an
enhancement. Id.
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administrable”; and it “cabins the discretion of trial judges, permits
meaningful judicial review, and produces reasonably predictable
results” due to its “objective” nature.54 The Court then listed six rules
established in its prior decisions: (1) that “a reasonable fee is . . .
sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the
representation of a meritorious civil rights case”55 but “does . . . not
produce windfalls to attorneys”56; (2) that there is a “strong”
presumption that the lodestar is “sufficient to achieve this
objective”57; (3) that “enhancements may be awarded in rare and
exceptional circumstances”58; (4) that the lodestar “includes most, if
not all, of the relevant factors constituting a reasonable attorney’s
fee” so that “an enhancement may not be awarded based on a factor
that is subsumed in the lodestar calculation,” such as “the novelty
and complexity of a case” or “the quality of an attorney’s
performance”59; (5) that the fee applicant bears “the burden of
proving that an enhancement is necessary”60; and (6) that the fee
applicant must produce “specific evidence” in support of
enhancement so that it is “objective and capable of being reviewed
on appeal.”61
3. Scenarios Warranting Lodestar Enhancement
In light of these guidelines, the Court inquired “whether there
are circumstances in which superior attorney performance is not
adequately taken into account in the lodestar calculation.”62 It found
that three such scenarios existed. First, attorney performance could
justify enhancement if the hourly rate did not represent the attorney’s
market value—for example, if a single factor or attribute such as
“years since admission to the bar” determined the hourly rate.63
However, the Court noted that “the special skill and experience of
54. Id. at 1672 (emphasis omitted).
55. Id. at 1672 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
57. Id. at 1673 (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. at 1674.
63. Id.
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counsel should be reflected in the reasonableness of the hourly
rates.”64 Attorney performance, then, should logically never justify
enhancement. According to the Court, superior performance would
justify enhancement if the reasonable hourly rate did not reflect it,
but the reasonable hourly rate should reflect all of an attorney’s
special qualities; therefore, the reasonable hourly rate should always
reflect superior performance, and superior performance would never
justify enhancement.
Second, the Court stated that “an enhancement may be
appropriate if the attorney’s performance includes an extraordinary
outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally protracted.”65
The Court acknowledged Judge Carnes’s observation that any
attorney taking on a civil rights case on a contingency-fee basis
“presumably understands that no reimbursement is likely to be
received until the successful resolution of the case”66; however, it
went on to conclude that enhancements on this basis may still be
appropriate in “unusual” or “exceptional” cases.67 This exception has
two problems. The Court declined to state what qualities would
render a case sufficiently extraordinary that an enhancement would
be appropriate, leaving lower courts with no more guidance on this
point than they had before. In addition, courts could apply the
exception to allow many—if not all—attorneys working on a
contingency basis to receive varying degrees68 of enhancement.
The third and final exception is similar to the second:
enhancement may be appropriate where “an attorney’s performance
involves exceptional delay in the payment of fees,” such as where
“an attorney assumes these costs in the face of unanticipated delay,
particularly where the delay is unjustifiably caused by the defense.”69
This exception is subject to the same infirmities as the second
exception is regarding lower courts’ interpretations of
64. Id. at 1674 n.5 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
65. Id. at 1674.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. For example, a court could award a 10 percent enhancement to an attorney advancing
significantly above-average costs and undergoing significantly lengthy litigation, a 20 percent
enhancement to an attorney advancing yet greater costs and litigating for yet longer, and so on.
See Parts III.C.4 and IV.C–D for further discussion of this problem.
69. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1675.
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“exceptional”:70 the same lack of specificity is present in the Court’s
mention of “unanticipated delay”—especially because “delay is a
routine feature of cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”71—and its
mention of delay that is “unjustifiably caused by the defense.”72
4. Analysis and Rejection of the Perdue Enhancement
Having concluded its abstract analysis, the Court proceeded to
the merits of the case at hand. It condemned the 75 percent
enhancement as “essentially arbitrary” and increased the hourly rate
to an amount not shown to be “an appropriate figure for the relevant
market.”73 The Court then examined the enhancement in light of its
three approved justifications for attorney-performance-based
enhancement of the lodestar. It identified five ways in which the
district court’s reasons for awarding the enhancement did not
withstand scrutiny: the court (1) “did not calculate the amount of the
enhancement that is attributable” to respondents’ “extraordinary
outlays for expenses” and delay in reimbursement; (2) failed to use
“proof in the record” to show that respondents’ delayed receipt of
fees was “outside the normal range expected by attorneys who rely
on § 1988”; (3) did not “provide a calculation of the cost to counsel
of any extraordinary and unwarranted delay”; (4) cited respondents’
fees’ contingent nature in contravention of the Court’s holding in
City of Burlington v. Dague;74 and (5) “did not employ a
methodology that permitted meaningful appellate review” because it
compared respondents’ performance to that of counsel in other
cases.75
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on calculation and quantification
in the first three points listed above illustrates the problems with the
Court’s scenarios where enhancement could be appropriate. The
70. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
71. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1671 (summarizing Judge Carnes’s reasoning at the Eleventh
Circuit level).
72. A lower court could consider a delay to be “unjustifiably raised by the defense” in an
array of circumstances ranging from an unsuccessful motion or defense that causes a delay to a
frivolous motion or defense that causes a delay. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “frivolous” as
“[l]acking a legal basis or legal merit” and a “frivolous defense” as “[a] defense that has no basis
in fact or law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 483, 739 (9th ed. 2009).
73. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1675–76.
74. 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
75. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1676 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Court did not provide—and, indeed, logic does not suggest—any
method of assigning a numerical value to “extraordinary outlays for
expenses and [delay in] reimbursement,” the extent to which delay in
receipt of fees is “outside the normal range” for § 1988 litigation, or
“extraordinary and unwarranted delay.”76 The Court’s very use of
subjectively defined adjectives (such as “extraordinary” and
“normal”) ensures that any enhancement based on these factors will
be inconsistent with a “major purpose of the lodestar method—
providing an objective and reviewable basis for fees.”77
The Court’s reasoning in the fourth and fifth points listed above
is stronger. A more careful analysis, however, reveals that the
reasoning from Dague cited in the fourth point undermines the latter
two scenarios in which the Court believed an enhancement may be
proper.78 In Dague, the Court “h[e]ld that enhancement for
contingency is not permitted”79 because it could “perceive no . . .
basis . . . by which contingency enhancement, if adopted, could be
restricted to fewer than all contingent-fee cases.”80 Because “no
claim has a 100% chance of success,” all contingent-fee cases would
receive fees exceeding the “reasonable amount.”81 Such excessive
fees would both “indiscriminately encourage[] nonmeritorious claims
to be brought” in addition to meritorious ones82 and increase the
“burdensome satellite litigation” that the lodestar approach sought to
avoid in the first place.83
The Court failed to consider that four of the five reasons for
rejecting the enhancement in Perdue also warranted rejecting two of
its three circumstances justifying enhancement.84 The fifth point—
that a court cannot grant an enhancement for unreviewable reasons—
creates another conundrum: the Court’s second and third acceptable
scenarios for enhancement would result in the same unreviewable
decisions due to the highly subjective nature of the requirements they
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992)).
See supra notes 65–72 and accompanying text.
Dague, 505 U.S. at 567.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 563.
Id.
Id. at 566 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 437 (1983)).
See supra notes 65–72.
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suggest.85 Rather than provide guidance, Perdue ultimately creates
more confusion due to the Court’s circular reasoning and its
implementation of an unworkable standard.
IV. PROPOSAL
Four opinions provide the key elements of this Comment’s
proposed solution to the confusion, subjectivity, and inconsistency of
fee awards under § 1988: Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment in Blanchard v. Bergeron,86 Justice
Thomas’s concurrence in Perdue,87 the end of the majority opinion in
Perdue,88 and the core of the majority opinion in Blum.89 The former
two advocate valuable simplifications of fees-award jurisprudence,
while the latter two contribute practical observations that should
guide the Supreme Court’s future decisions.
A. Justice Scalia in Blanchard
Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion in Blanchard solely to
address an aspect of the majority’s analysis that is also relevant to
Perdue.90 Like many courts determining attorney’s fees under
§ 1988,91 the Blanchard majority stated early in its opinion that “[i]n
many past cases considering the award of attorney’s fees under
§ 1988, we have turned our attention to Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc.”;92 it went on to list the twelve factors93 and apply
85. See supra notes 65–72 (using terms such as “extraordinary,” “exceptionally,”
“unanticipated,” and “unjustifiably” to define the requirements for acceptably enhancing the
lodestar).
86. 489 U.S. 87, 97–100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
87. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1677–78 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
88. Id. at 1676–77 (majority opinion).
89. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892–902 (1984).
90. See Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 97–100 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“I concur in the judgment and join the opinion of the Court except that portion which
rests upon detailed analysis of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc. and [related cases].” (citation omitted)). The actual holding in Blanchard is not
relevant to Perdue.
91. See, e.g., Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1671–72; Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 798–801
(2002); Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562–64
(1986); Blum, 465 U.S. at 896–97; Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F.2d 1258, 1262–63 (9th Cir.
1987).
92. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 91.
93. Id. at 91 n.5.

Spring 2011]

PERDUE V. KENNY A.

1125

them94 before turning to the lodestar method, which ultimately led to
the holding.95
Troubled by the majority’s focus on Johnson despite the Court’s
recognition that a “reasonable attorney’s fee is properly calculated by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended . . . times a
reasonable hourly rate”96 and that there is a “strong presumption that
the lodestar figure . . . represents a ‘reasonable fee,’”97 Justice Scalia
condemned the majority for “expand[ing] . . . our cases’ excessive
preoccupation . . . with the 12-factor Johnson analysis” and
Johnson’s related cases.98 He disparaged the idea that Johnson’s
inclusion in the § 1988 Senate and House Committee Reports bound
the Court to use Johnson as a guide to legislative intent99 and
reminded his colleagues that they had voted to use the lodestar
method instead.100
Justice Scalia makes a valuable point. Because courts have
universally concluded that the lodestar method “has, as its name
suggests, become the guiding light of our fee-shifting
jurisprudence,”101 the Johnson factors seem to create more confusion
than clarity. “Reasonable hours” appears to subsume two of the
twelve factors,102 and a “reasonable hourly rate” appears to subsume

94. Id. at 92–94.
95. Id. at 94–97.
96. Id. at 94 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 888).
97. Id. at 95 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S.
546, 565 (1986)).
98. Id. at 99 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
99. Id. at 98–99 (“I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members of Congress
read either one of the Committee Reports in question . . . . As anyone familiar with modern-day
drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the references to [Johnson and its
related cases] were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and
at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of
those references was not primarily to inform the Members of Congress what the bill meant . . . ,
but rather to influence judicial construction.”).
100. Id. at 99 (“This expansion is all the more puzzling because I had thought that in . . .
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, we had acknowledged our
emancipation from Johnson.” (citations omitted)).
101. E.g., Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1672 (2010) (quoting City of
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
102. See Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1672 n.4; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3 (1983)
(listing courts’ considerations in determining “reasonable hours,” which include Johnson factors
(1) and (4)); supra text accompanying note 29.
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the other ten.103 As a result, none of the Johnson factors justify
enhancement—“duplicat[ing] . . . factors already subsumed in the
lodestar . . . amounts to double counting.”104 The Johnson factors
now serve only to create inconsistency,105 and Johnson should be
expressly disapproved the next time the Court grants certiorari in a
§ 1988 case.
B. Justice Thomas in Perdue
In his concurrence in Perdue, Justice Thomas appeared to
question the need for enhancement under any circumstances.
Although he did not go so far as to suggest that enhancement should
never occur, he emphasized the majority’s limitations on
enhancement and its recognition of the likelihood that enhancement
would “double count”106 a factor already accounted for in the
lodestar.107
Justice Thomas’s view is based on the well-settled rule that “the
burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in
addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are
in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by
lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and

103. See Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1672 n.4; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3 (listing courts’
considerations in determining “reasonable hourly rate,” which include Johnson factors (2), (3),
and (5) through (12)); supra text accompanying note 29.
104. Dague, 505 U.S. at 562–63.
105. A comparison of two recent unpublished district court opinions illustrates the varying
ways in which lower courts currently apply the Johnson factors, resulting in a lack of uniformity.
The Jin v. Pacific Buffet House, Inc., No. 06-CV-579 (VVP), 2010 WL 2653334 (E.D.N.Y. June
25, 2010), district court asserted that the Second Circuit had formulated an “Arbor Hill approach”
whereby the Johnson factors are used to determine the reasonable hourly rate, which is then
multiplied by the reasonable hours spent. Id. at *1–2 & n.1. In contrast, the district court in Sound
v. Koller, No. 09-00409 JMS/KSC, 2010 WL 1992194 (D. Haw. May 19, 2010), declared that it
“must decide whether to enhance or reduce the lodestar figure based on an evaluation of the
[Johnson] factors that are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation.” Id. at *5 &
n.4.
106. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 566 (1986)
(“Because considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing party’s counsel’s representation
normally are reflected in the reasonable hourly rate, the overall quality of performance ordinarily
should not be used to adjust the lodestar, thus removing any danger of ‘double counting.’”).
107. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1677–78 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[The Court has] never
sustained an enhancement of a lodestar amount for performance, and our jurisprudence since
Blum has charted ‘a decisional arc that bends decidedly against enhancements’ . . . . [T]he
lodestar calculation will in virtually every case already reflect all indicia of attorney performance
relevant to a fee award.” (citation omitted)).
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reputation.”108 If a court computes the lodestar properly, then, the
first scenario in which the Perdue majority approved a possible
enhancement—for example, if the reasonable hourly rate were based
on a single factor such as “years since admission to the bar”109—will
never occur.110 A court finding that its lodestar warrants enhancement
because the hourly rate did not take into account some salient
characteristic should recalculate the lodestar using reasonable rates
and reasonable hours as described above—it should not attempt to
compensate for the faulty lodestar by applying an enhancement.
C. Practical Considerations in Perdue
In the last two paragraphs of the Perdue majority opinion, the
Court made three points that—though mentioned almost as an
afterthought and not truly brought to bear on the analysis—speak to
the fundamental justice and practicality of fees-award jurisprudence.
First, the Court stated that without consistency in § 1988 awards,
“defendants contemplating the possibility of settlement will have no
way to estimate the likelihood of having to pay a potentially huge
enhancement,” thereby undermining public policy, which favors
settlement.111 Second, the Court asserted that “unjustified
enhancements that serve only to enrich attorneys are not consistent
with [§ 1988’s] aim”112 because the statute “was enacted to ensure
that civil rights plaintiffs are adequately represented, not to
provide . . . a windfall” to attorneys.113 Third and perhaps most
importantly, the Court noted that taxpayers—as opposed to the actual
wrongdoers—frequently end up paying fees awards, and “money that
is used to pay attorney’s fees is money that cannot be used for
programs that provide vital public services.”114
The Court’s holding in Perdue is inconsistent with these policy
considerations. The circumstances that the majority felt would justify
enhancement are so subjective that they render fees awards
108. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895–96 n.11 (1984) (emphasis added).
109. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1674.
110. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
111. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1676 (citing Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)).
112. Id.; Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989) (“[T]he very nature of recovery
under § 1988 is designed to prevent any . . . windfall.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
113. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1677 n.8.
114. Id. at 1677 (citing Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593–94 (2009)).
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unpredictable and discourage defendants from settling. Increasing a
fee award above what is reasonable by applying an enhancement will
always implicate the Court’s concerns about windfalls to plaintiffs’
attorneys and draining public funds. Even if litigation “is
exceptionally protracted” or “involves exceptional delay in the
payment of fees,”115 the lodestar approach ensures that a prevailing
attorney will be paid reasonably for services rendered.116 The Perdue
Court, then, successfully identified the key public policy
considerations that § 1988 fees awards implicate; however, the Court
failed to arrive at a holding consistent with these policies. The Court
should rectify this omission in its next fees-award case.
D. Practical Considerations in Blum
The Blum majority discussed an aspect of fees awards that has
received little attention in the twenty-six years since that opinion’s
publication but should be discussed in the Court’s next § 1988 case.
Blum sought a definition of “prevailing market rate” to use both in
determining the lodestar’s “reasonable hourly rate” and in calculating
any enhancement.117 In Blum, attorneys from a nonprofit firm
represented plaintiff-respondents in a § 1983 action.118 When
respondents prevailed, defendant-petitioners argued that “the use of
prevailing market rates to calculate attorney’s fees under § 1988
leads to exorbitant fee awards and provides windfalls to civil rights
counsel” who were not working for profit.119 Petitioners and their
amicus curiae therefore urged the court to award fees “according to
the cost of providing legal services . . . [b]ecause market rates
incorporate operating expenses that may exceed the expenses of
nonprofit legal services organizations, and include an element of
profit unnecessary to attract nonprofit counsel.”120

115. See supra notes 58, 61.
116. When a defendant protracts litigation or unreasonably delays victory (and therefore
payment), plaintiff’s counsel will naturally receive a fee reflecting a very large number of
reasonably expended hours.
117. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888–89 (1984).
118. Id. at 889–90.
119. Id. at 892.
120. Id. at 892–93.
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The Court cited Stanford Daily v. Zurcher121 and Davis v.
County of Los Angeles,122 two of Johnson’s123 companion cases, as
well as § 1988 itself in rejecting petitioners’ argument as contrary to
congressional intent.124 An alternative and perhaps more compelling
rationale for this conclusion lies in the traditional tort principle that
“[t]hings which happen [after a defendant’s tort] and let an injured
plaintiff escape some of the ultimate consequences of the wrong
done him do not inure to the benefit of the defendant.”125 Here too, a
defendant found guilty of a civil rights violation should not owe less
under § 1988 merely because nonprofit counsel represents his
victim—any benefit should inure to counsel, who are innocent of any
wrongdoing, rather than to the defendant. In addition, the Court held
that the distinction between private and nonprofit representation—
like complexity, novelty, quality of representation, number of
persons represented, and (generally) quality of representation and
results obtained—did not justify enhancement.126
The Court noted that legal practice does not operate like a
normal supply-and-demand market, so “[i]n this traditional sense
there is no such thing as a prevailing market rate for the service of
lawyers in a particular community.”127 From this observation, the
121. 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Courts “must avoid . . . decreasing reasonable fees
because the attorneys conducted the litigation more as an act of pro bono publico than as an effort
at securing a large monetary return.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 (quoting Stanford Daily, 64 F.R.D. at
681) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. No. 73-63-WPG, 1974 WL 180 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 1974). “It is in the interest of the
public that [nonprofit] law firms be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees to be computed in the
traditional manner.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 (quoting Davis, 1974 WL 180, at *2) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
123. Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714 (1974).
124. “The statute and legislative history establish that ‘reasonable fees’ under § 1988 are to be
calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of
whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895.
125. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 829 (M.D. Pa. 1960),
aff’d, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1960); id. at 829–30 (“Thus, if a man is injured by the negligence of
another and has the good fortune to have an insurance policy which recompenses him for loss, the
insurance money does not reduce the damages which the wrongdoer must pay. If friends of a man
against whom a tort is committed make up a purse to pay for his medical services, that does not
cut down what the plaintiff may recover from the tortfeasor. Wages continued by an employer
during a time when an injured man is not working do not redound to the benefit of the wrongdoer.
And, likewise, if a man having sustained an injury works extra hard after his recovery and comes
out at the end of the year as financially well off as he would have been without the loss of time,
the wrongdoer cannot claim reduction of damages on this account.” (footnotes omitted)).
126. Blum, 465 U.S. at 898–902.
127. Id. at 895 n.11.
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Court reasoned that private-counsel rates provide the best proxy for
the prevailing market rate and reiterated the general rule that
requested rates should parallel those sought by “lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.”128
While these observations appear facially consistent, they present
a significant policy problem in light of the Perdue majority’s third
practical observation:129 private attorneys bill much more per hour
than nonprofit attorneys do,130 so prevailing hourly rates based on
private rates impose a very high cost on the public. If, for example, a
court finds an individual police officer guilty of violating a suspect’s
civil rights, the city or county must pay not only the damages award
but also a fees award based on a private, for-profit hourly rate; this is
true even if the case were handled pro bono or if the private attorney
handling the case were of lesser “skill, experience, and reputation”
than the majority of pro bono attorneys handling such cases.131
The Court has offered no reason to believe that fees awards
based on average hourly rates—rather than on private, for-profit
hourly rates—charged by attorneys of a particular caliber would not
serve § 1988’s purpose of “ensur[ing] that [civil] rights are
adequately enforced.”132 An hourly rate so calculated would also
impose lesser costs on the public—thereby maximizing public
benefit—and be more consistent with the plain language that defines
the lodestar method as the product of reasonable hours and the
prevailing rate.133
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court undoubtedly ruled properly in
striking down the enhancement, Perdue represents a missed
opportunity. The trial court imposed a huge enhancement that opened
the door for the Court to strike down enhancements as a class.
However, the Court neglected to rule broadly, apparently
overlooking its own precedent that defined the lodestar and identified
the public policies underlying fees awards. Furthermore, the Court
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
See supra note 114.
See, e.g., Blum, 465 U.S. at 892.
Id. at 892 n.6.
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1671 (2010).
E.g., Blum, 465 U.S. at 895.
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recited and used the Johnson factors despite its own frequent
criticism of that method of fee calculation as granting excessive
discretion to trial courts and despite the ample evidence of that
criticism’s accuracy.
The Court must dispose of enhancements and the Johnson
factors if it is to avoid burdensome fees litigation, foster uniformity,
prevent windfalls to attorneys at the expense of taxpayers, and
encourage predictability so as to promote settlement. By adhering to
the practical simplicity of the lodestar approach and keeping policy
considerations in mind, the Court can provide lower courts the
guidance they lack and promote reasonable § 1988 fees awards when
they next grant certiorari in a case like Perdue.
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